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1. Summary  
There is growing interest in ways in which donors can be influenced. While there is some 
nascent literature on how behavioural insights can be used to influence policy makers (see 
Helpdesk report, no. 1426), there is very limited research and evidence on the ways in which 
donors influence other donors. Based on the available literature, this report focuses in large part 
on descriptive research on influencing multilateral development agencies (much of which is 
focused on DFID) and on triangular (or trilateral) cooperation, involving emerging donors.  
Bilateral donors can attempt to influence multilateral development agencies to adopt particular 
approaches and to achieve particular development outcomes through various means:  
 Financing: Donors have sought to influence multilateral agencies through their financial 
contributions and the negotiations that occur in advance of funding replenishment.  
 Formal structures: Donors can achieve influence through their formal voting shares or 
seats on the board of multilateral agencies; engagement at board meetings; and 
negotiation of framework agreements, such as Memorandums of Understanding. 
 Strategy: In order to improve the chances of influence, bilateral donors need a clear 
strategy for their engagement with the multilateral system as a whole. 
 Leadership positions and secondments: Influence can come from more informal 
channels, such as placing senior-level nationals in leadership positions, to influence key 
decision makers; and fostering positive relations among staff in different agencies. 
Relations can improve with consistent engagement and the development of mutual trust.  
 Knowledge and thought leadership: Donors considered to be key thought leaders 
have a greater chance of having a significant impact on the policy and research agenda 
of multilateral agencies. 
 Oversight: Bilateral donors can provide effective oversight of multilateral agencies, as a 
shareholder and a donor.  
Triangular cooperation involves a development partnership between at least one member of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance 
Committee (OECD-DAC) and one or more providers of South-South cooperation. Trilateral 
cooperation can foster mutual trust between traditional donors and new donors, and promote 
mutual learning and friendly relations. Traditional donors see triangular cooperation as a way to 
safeguard Northern influence over South-South cooperation, bringing about a convergence of 
norms and practices between traditional donors and new donors (Paulo, 2018; Lengfelder, 2016; 
Kondoh, 2015; Hausmann, 2014). It provides a way for traditional donors to influence and 
sensitise new donors to aid effectiveness principles and to foster a shared understanding of 
development cooperation. If new donors learns aid practices from DAC member countries, they 
are more likely to adopt a similar regime as the DAC aid model (Kondoh, 2015). 
In the case of China-UNDP triangular cooperation, the UNDP has effectively influenced the 
Chinese government’s thinking as an advisor to the Chinese government on aid cooperation 
(Zhang, 2017). DFID, has also attempted to positively influence China’s engagement with 
international development through triangular cooperation and investment in technical assistance, 
training, exchange visits and research studies with China. Alongside establishing a USAID 
counsellor position in Beijing, the US has engaged directly with China’s top leaders on 
development cooperation, in order to secure political commitment from China for specific trilateral 
projects. In comparison, US and UK models of triangular cooperation with India have a weak 
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government-to-government dimension, centring on leveraging the strengths of India’s non-state 
actors, civil society organisations and research institutes.  
Challenges involved with triangular aid cooperation include: complicated coordination efforts and 
high transaction costs; fragmentation in development cooperation and in country strategies; 
absence of a shared narrative among all countries involved; inadequate evaluation; and lack of 
clarity on what indicators to adopt to measure success. Triangular cooperation can also be 
challenging if it does not build on an existing, strong partnership. This was the case with Brazil 
and Canada (Farias, 2015), for example, in contrast to the China-Australia-Papua Guinea’s 
malaria project, which built on a natural interest and firmer partnership (Zhang, 2015a). 
Capturing, documenting and sharing research and evidence of impact and learning can also be 
effective in influencing other donors to adopt or replicate particular approaches. In addition, 
global goals, such as the Sustainable Development Goals, have the power to influence policy 
behaviour and development agendas, serving as incentives for governments and others to 
mobilise for important objectives.  
The mere presence of non-DAC donors can also influence the actions of other donors. An 
empirical study reveals that the World Bank attaches fewer conditions to its loans in Africa when 
China is also a donor (Hernandez, 2017). This is most likely in order to maintain its level of 
involvement in the region despite competition from new donors (Hernandez, 2017).  
2. Influencing multilateral development agencies 
Bilateral donors can leverage and impact the multilateral system, aligning agencies around key 
development themes (e.g. gender, promoting reform and improving results) to achieve their 
development objectives (see ICAI, 2015). EU member states, for example, use the EU to pursue 
a variety of development objectives, through multiplying or projecting inﬂuence, extending 
geographical reach, beneﬁting from economies of scale, or improving efﬁciency or impact (Gavas 
and Maxwell, 2017). DFID, for example, has consistently encouraged multilateral agencies at the 
country level to focus on results and value for money (ICAI, 2015). While the system as a whole 
has been slow to change, individual agencies have responded well to these goals. They have 
improved value for money at both country and project levels (ICAI, 2015). 
Financing 
Donors have sought to influence multilateral agencies through their financial contributions. The 
willingness of DFID to co-finance World Bank projects (even on a small scale), for example, has 
increased DFID’s negotiation capacity (Bird et al., 2005). DFID’s funding and reputation has 
made it effective in pushing for improvements in performance and seeking to set specific 
agendas with its partner multilateral agencies (ICAI, 2015). Negotiations to replenish Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) funding, which occurs every four years, constitute the main high-level 
engagement between DFID (and other donors) and the Bank. There is evidence that DFID has 
been successful in using financing and its minority shareholding in the ADB to influence the 
agency’s strategy, policies and internal reforms. This includes garnering ADB support for a 
measurable results framework, inclusive growth, gender-based reforms, climate change 
initiatives and operational effectiveness (ICAI, 2012a). In India, DFID’s provision of funding in 
some of the poorest states has encouraged the ADB to become more heavily engaged in those 
states, with greater levels of loan approval (ICAI, 2012a). 
4 
There are limitations, however. Greenhill and Rabinowitz (2016) note that donors are more 
inclined to delegate more money to multilaterals who already share their objectives and are thus 
less in need of influence. In such cases, financing may not necessarily play a role in influencing. 
In addition, as there are multiple donors to multilateral agencies, it is difficult for any one donor to 
influence the agencies. While replenishment negotiations for the European Development Fund 
provide opportunities for DFID policy influence, for example, the UK is only one among many 
funders (ICAI, 2015).  
Formal structures 
Influence can come from formal voting shares or seats on the board of multilateral agencies 
(Greenhill and Rabinowitz, 2016).  DFID and the UK delegation to the World Bank, for example, 
provide effective oversight of the Bank, as a shareholder and as a donor. They engage with the 
Bank’s management to influence priorities, monitor delivery and improve effectiveness (ICAI, 
2012b). Engagement occurs regularly, at the strategic level, through meetings of the Board of 
Governors and through the International Development Association replenishment process; and, 
at the policy level, through Executive Board meetings. DFID staff in policy teams, and in country 
offices, also interact directly with their counterparts in the Bank (ICAI, 2012b; ICAI, 2015). 
Further, DFID often co-chairs and leads donor co-ordination mechanisms, development plan 
steering structures to align key activities, and forums to bring coherence of impact at country or 
sectoral levels (ICAI, 2015). Its involvement in such structures has helped to foster collaboration 
(ICAI, 2015). 
DFID’s investment in the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), administered by the World Bank, and 
its seat on the CIF Trust Fund committee, has allowed for on-going engagement and dialogue. 
This has facilitated DFID’s influence of the CIFs at both Board and technical levels, in terms of 
strengthening results frameworks, gender approaches, targeted development programmes, and 
transparency and inclusiveness (ICAI, 2015).  
According to a review, conducted by the ICAI, on DFID’s engagement with the World Bank, 
senior executives at Bank headquarters considered the contributions of the UK delegation 
members as ‘active and constructive’ (ICAI, 2012b). DFID has also used its minority 
shareholding to effectively influence objectives of the Asian Development Bank. The ICAI review 
of DFID’s engagement with the ADB revealed that senior management in the Bank commented 
positively on the UK’s contributions to influencing the Bank’s policies and performance (ICAI, 
2012a). DFID has limited resources, however, in terms of staff, to carry out its shareholder role in 
multilateral agencies (ICAI, 2012a). Its ability to fundamentally shift the focus of the organisations 
is thus constrained (ICAI, 2015). 
Donors have also attempted to increase their influence within key multilateral agencies through 
the negotiation of framework agreements, such as Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs). 
Such MoUs can give a greater degree of influence and visibility for donor’s multilateral aid 
(Greenhill and Rabinowitz, 2016). Australia, for example, has partnership agreements with 17 
multilateral agencies, including the World Bank and ADB, driven by interests in leveraging 
support in the Pacific. France has also influenced multilateral agencies to better meet its 
objectives. For example, during the 15
th
 IDA replenishment, France was successful in gaining a 
commitment by the World Bank for greater resources to Sub-Saharan Africa – and to priority 
countries for French cooperation (Greenhill and Rabinowitz, 2016). 
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Strategy 
An ICAI review of engagement with multilateral agencies emphasises that DFID lacks a clear 
strategy for its work with multilaterals. In addition, its focus on results and on improving agencies’ 
management processes has often been at the expense of strategic dialogue on what 
multilaterals do and how they do it (ICAI, 2015). With regard to the EU, DFID’s engagement 
varies from country to country. This is due in part to the absence of a clear strategy on how to 
influence the EU and its programming and spending (ICAI, 2015).  
Bilateral donors should adopt a clear strategy for interventions for each multilateral agency that 
matches their needs and be clear about the roles that they expect the different types of agencies 
to play, such as in relation to standard setting, co-financing, policy shaping and delivery (ICAI, 
2015). The Sustainable Development Goals are a way in which to develop multilateral strategies 
and objectives at the country level (ICAI, 2015) (see ‘Global goals’ section).  A focus on specific 
issues can lead to improvements in multilateral impact in line with donor country priorities, such 
as efforts to improve gender equality (ICAI, 2015). For example, DFID successfully ensured that 
improved performance measures concerning gender were included when it negotiated its 16
th
 
IDA replenishment (ICAI, 2015). 
Leadership positions and secondments 
Influence can come from more informal channels, such as having nationals in leadership 
positions (Greenhill and Rabinowitz, 2016). The extent to which such positions actually confer 
influence, however, is unclear (Greenhill and Rabinowitz, 2016). DFID’s engagement with other 
agencies at senior level has been dominated by efforts to align them behind disciplines similar to 
those held by those in the department themselves (ICAI, 2015).  
There is a greater chance of influencing multilateral agencies when relations between bilateral 
donors and multilateral agencies are good, on an institutional level and a personal level between 
individual members of staff (Bird et al., 2005). Such relations improve with consistent 
engagement from experienced staff, particularly on the technical level (ICAI, 2015). However, 
there is often insufficient assignment of senior staff and level of interaction with multilateral 
agencies, which seems inconsistent with the high proportion of funds given to these agencies. 
While some agency relationships, such as the DFID-World Bank relationship, are well resourced, 
the quality of DFID offices’ engagement with the EU at country level is variable (ICAI, 2015).  
DFID can improve its influence by ensuring that staff deployed to multilateral agencies are at a 
senior level and have the skills and experience necessary to influence key decision makers 
(ICAI, 2015).  The most important multilateral relationships should have a senior person at 
Management Board level, for example, with responsibility for maintaining key personal 
relationships and overseeing the network of inter-agency staff interactions (ICAI, 2015). 
Experienced and senior DFID staff can have a large influence on multilateral agencies, not only 
through their presence in UK delegations, but also through secondments. DFID secondees at 
multilateral agencies’ headquarters and country offices regularly provide an opportunity for 
mutual learning, including contextual learning to improve programme delivery. They also play a 
key role in driving institutional reform (ICAI, 2015).  
In the case of the UNDP and China, secondment of Chinese officials to UNDP headquarters and 
regional offices provided the opportunity for officials to better understand the UNDP’s aid policies 
and to diversify their experience (Zhang, 2017). These secondments have yielded tangible 
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results, including new projects between China and the UNDP concerning renewable energy in 
Fiji and urban community development in Bangladesh (Zhang, 2017). 
Knowledge and thought leadership  
DFID is considered by multilateral agencies to be a key thought leader. This allows it to have a 
significant impact on the policy and research agenda of multilateral agencies (ICAI, 2015). There 
are concerns, however, that DFID’s contribution to thought leadership has diminished in recent 
years, connected to the donor’s shift towards a more transactional, rather than transformational, 
approach in its interactions with multilateral agencies (ICAI, 2015).  
DFID has also adopted a pro-active approach in the past to discover information about current 
work within the World Bank, such as on Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA), by 
requesting progress reports and attending World Bank organised workshops. This has increased 
the donor’s ability to provide input and influence PSIA processes (Bird et al., 2005). 
Oversight and emphasis on results  
DFID provides effective oversight of the World Bank, as a shareholder and a donor. It has 
advocated for improved cost effectiveness in agencies (ICAI, 2015). DFID’s focus on results and 
technical issues, however, can undermine its contribution to ideas and insights and determination 
of strategic priorities (ICAI, 2015).  Interviews with multilateral agencies reveal that DFID’s 
insistence on its results framework can be overly cumbersome and bureaucratic (ICAI, 2015).  
3. Triangular cooperation 
Triangular cooperation involves a development partnership cooperation, involving at least one 
bilateral provider from the OECD-DAC (or an international organisation) and one or more 
providers of South-South cooperation. The purpose is to promote sharing of knowledge and 
experience and implementing development projects (OECD, cited in Paulo, 2018, p. 3; 
Hausmann, 2014, p. 36). Traditional bilateral and multilateral donors act as ‘facilitators’ that 
contribute funding in addition to experience and know-how of managing development 
cooperation (Paulo, 2018). They also support triangular cooperation through their extensive 
networks of embassies and development agencies throughout the developing world (Paulo, 
2018).  
Triangular cooperation can be seen as a way to safeguard Northern influence over South-South 
cooperation and to transform donor strategies with emerging powers and other middle income 
countries (Paulo, 2018). In the case of the UK, for example, its exit as a donor from China, India, 
Indonesia and South Africa was accompanied by transition to a new kind of relationship (ICAI, 
2016). Trilateral cooperation builds up mutual trust between traditional donors and emerging 
donors, and promotes mutual learning (Zhang, 2015a). Emerging economies can transfer 
knowledge to traditional donors and third countries from their own development experiences 
(Hausmann, 2014).  
The expansion of trade relations can be a strong motivation for fostering strategic partnerships 
with emerging countries. Triangular cooperation can foster friendly relationships, which may 
result in increased trade volumes, better market access and free trade agreements (Lengfelder, 
2016). Trade, thus, can be an additional incentive to engagement in triangular cooperation. 
7 
Spreading DAC norms 
Aid from emerging donors are not subject to OECD-DAC evaluation mechanisms (Lengfelder, 
2016). The position of emerging donors on global development issues and their support for 
developing countries are shaped by their own values and interests, which may well be different to 
the views of members of the OECD-DAC (ICAI, 2016). More experienced donors may feel that 
they should pass on their expertise, whereas new donors may believe they have their own way of 
doing things. Trilateral cooperation provides an opportunity for dialogue and exchange 
(Lengfelder, 2016).  
Identities and donor norms are influential in building and re-building aid models. Chinese aid has 
been appreciated in part because its approach is distinct from the DAC aid model. In contrast, 
South Africa has incorporated elements of the DAC aid model in order to appease its neighbours 
who are apprehensive about their asymmetric relationship and trade dependency on South Africa 
(Kondoh, 2015). If an emerging donor learns aid practices from DAC member countries, it is 
more likely to adopt a similar regime as the DAC aid model (Kondoh, 2015). Learning through 
triangular relationship can thus influence the process of convergence of emerging donors 
(Kondoh, 2015). 
Traditional donors see triangular cooperation as a way to bring about a convergence of norms 
and practices between emerging countries and DAC donors, allowing them to influence and 
sensitise new donors to aid effectiveness principles and foster a shared understanding of 
development cooperation (Paulo, 2018; Lengfelder, 2016; Kondoh, 2015; Hausmann, 2014). This 
can contribute to integrating Southern partners into the established international architecture of 
development cooperation (Paulo, 2018; Lengfelder, 2016).  Germany has engaged in triangular 
cooperation projects with China, for example, with the intention of aligning China’s aid with 
sustainability standards (Lengfelder, 2016). DAC donors can also seek to impart their experience 
with development cooperation to new donors through their integration into triangular agreements 
(Lengfelder, 2016). Further, DAC donors and multilateral agencies produce and disseminate new 
norms on development and aid through a range of annual publications (Kondoh, 2015). 
China 
The increase in China’s development aid in recent years has contributed to its growing desire to 
learn useful aid policies and practices from traditional donors and UN agencies, such as on aid 
procedures, evaluation and monitoring (Zhang, 2017). In turn, traditional donors and multilateral 
agencies have pushed for triangular aid cooperation with China, while phasing out or reducing 
aid to China. They expect that such cooperation could facilitate their understanding of Chinese 
foreign aid and increase their leverage and influence over China’s aid policies. Chinese officials 
have noted that where they believe western countries are faring better, they will absorb their 
good practices (Zhang, 2017).  
Multilateral agencies: The Chinese definition of foreign aid differs from the OECD’s definition of 
Official Development Assistance. Concessional loans, for example, account for more than half of 
Chinese aid spending while some traditional donors only provide grants (Zhang, 2018). Although 
China has charted a donor path different from OECD-DAC donors, it has engaged with the 
OECD-DAC. They established a study group in 2009, for example, with the aim of both 
promoting knowledge sharing and experience exchanges between the two sides and introducing 
China’s development experience to Africa (OECD, 2011; cited in Zhang, 2018). 
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The European Union and China have also differed in their approaches to international 
development assistance. EU member states have been supportive of the trilateral cooperation 
initiative with China, with the hope of fostering a strategic relationship between Africa, China and 
the EU that does not deteriorate into antagonistic competition for Africa (Hooijmaaijers, 2018). In 
2008, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on China’s policy in Africa, alleging that 
China’s unconditional support for African autocracies has caused human rights violations. It 
urged China to cut down its fiscal support to those regimes (Hooijmaaijers, 2018). 
In the case of China-UNDP triangular cooperation, the UNDP has effectively influenced the 
Chinese government’s thinking as an advisor to the Chinese government on aid cooperation. The 
Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China have frequently 
approached the UNDP for policy advice (Zhang, 2017). The UNDP has produced policy reports 
for China, with advice on the evolution of the then G20 working group; and provided counsel on 
potential areas of development cooperation between China and Africa. The Ministry of 
Commerce and UNDP have also engaged in joint research on the Pacific island countries and 
identified potential areas for trilateral aid cooperation between traditional donors and China; while 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNDP have co-hosted an international workshop on the post-
2015 development framework (Zhang, 2017). 
UK: DFID’s business plan for working with China, prepared in 2016, identifies as one of its 
strategic objectives positively influencing China’s engagement in the international development 
system and its contribution to international public goods, such as climate change mitigation (ICAI, 
2016). It seeks to provide direct support to improve the developmental impact of Chinese 
investments in third countries, particularly in Africa, through triangular cooperation. China and 
DFID have piloted trilateral aid partnerships in Malawi, Uganda and Bangladesh (Zhang, 2018). 
DFID also invests in technical assistance, training, exchange visits and research studies with 
China. It is unclear, however, the extent to which such initiatives have yielded results. While 
there are some indications that China has shown more willingness to work jointly with DFID and 
other donors, trilateral cooperation has taken time to develop and may not deliver at the intended 
scale. DFID China has committed to measuring and capturing results more systematically 
(Zhang, 2018). 
US: The United States has also attempted to use trilateral development cooperation with China 
in part to shape the country into a responsible stakeholder, whereas China uses such 
cooperation to build a positive image, learn from traditional donors, and to strengthen the broader 
China-US relationship (Zhang, 2017 and 2018).  Alongside establishing a USAID counsellor 
position in Beijing in 2008, the US has engaged directly with China’s top leaders on development 
cooperation, which has been important in securing political commitment from China for specific 
trilateral projects. The two countries have been providing joint training for Afghan diplomats since 
2013, and completed an agricultural aid project in Timor-Leste, drawing on China’s own expertise 
in small-scale agricultural farming and experience in eradicating extreme rural poverty (Zhang, 
2018 and 2015b). In 2015, China and the US signed a MoU on development cooperation and 
pledged to engage in further trilateral cooperation (Zhang, 2018). At the same time, the US has 
been a vocal critic of Chinese aid, which has evolved distinctly from the OECD-DAC (Zhang, 
2018). 
Australia: Australia and China signed a MoU on development cooperation in 2013, agreeing to 
conduct triangular cooperation on priority areas, including health (Zhang, 2015a). Trilateral aid 
cooperation is considered to be an important way for Australia to influence China’s aid delivery 
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and also for Australia to draw on China’s own recent development experience, for example in 
eradicating malaria within its own borders (Zhang, 2015a). The Australia-China-PNG malaria 
project is considered to be a success in part because it drew on a shared interest and firm 
partnership (Zhang, 2015a). Such cooperation can strengthen mutual trust between traditional 
and emerging donors China, and promote mutual learning (Zhang, 2015a). 
Japan: Japan has attempted to promote dialog and cooperation in Asia, in part through triangular 
cooperation with emerging donors. It cultivates positive diplomatic relations and friendships 
through triangular cooperation in projects that are consistent with the policies or the needs of the 
partner and beneficiary countries (MOFA, Japan, 2013). Japan’s triangular cooperation has 
resulted in extensive third-country training and dispatch of third-country experts, with positive 
evaluations given by partner and beneficiary countries (MOFA, Japan, 2013). It has also resulted 
in improved understanding of Japan’s diplomatic goals by partner and beneficiary countries, such 
as in the case of trilateral cooperation with Malaysia and the Republic of Zambia (MOFA, Japan, 
2013). 
India 
Triangular cooperation is also a growing trend in India’s global engagement, with official 
government endorsement and high-profile initiatives, such as the Indo-Japanese plan for an 
Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (Paulo, 2018). DFID/India’s ‘Global Partnerships Team’ and 
USAID/India’s ‘Centre for Innovations and Partnerships’ are examples of organisational 
innovations, serving as hubs for expertise, knowledge and partnership building (Paulo, 2018). 
The UK and US models of triangular cooperation with India have a weak government-to-
government dimension, centring instead on leveraging the strengths of India’s non-state actors, 
civil society organisations and research institutes, among others (Paulo, 2018). 
UK: The Indian Ministry of External Affairs and DFID signed the ‘Statement of Intent on 
Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries’ in 2015. It reaffirms the aims of the two countries 
to deepen their cooperation in developing countries and to jointly assist these countries to 
address their development challenges. India-UK triangular cooperation include the ‘Global 
Research Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security, Health and Women’ and the South-South 
aid-for-trade programme ‘Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa’ (Paulo, 2018). 
Indian partners have emphasized the collaborative nature of the partnerships with the UK and 
various contributions made by the UK, including the identification of partners and support of 
implementation of initiatives in African countries (Paulo, 2018).   
Triangular cooperation could be strengthened through: the creation of focal points for such 
cooperation in Indian overseas representations and DFID country offices, which could facilitate 
interaction and cooperation with governments in Africa; and the strengthening of transnational 
networks, such as among research institutions (Paulo, 2018) 
Brazil 
Japan: A successful example of triangular cooperation between Japan, Brazil and Angola 
involved strengthening the health system in Angola. Angola benefitted from Brazil’s centres of 
excellence, which supported improvements in primary and tertiary healthcare in Angola, 
alongside Japan’s financial and technical support. This included provision of experience on 
maternal and child health handbooks (Sakurai, 2015). The benefits produced by this 
collaboration indicates that traditional and multilateral donors should identify and work with 
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existing Southern centres of excellence in key development areas, through triangular 
arrangements (Sakurai, 2015). 
Canada: Canada’s development relationship with Brazil has evolved from a donor/recipient one 
to that of development cooperation partners, with the rise of Brazil as a development provider 
itself. Canada seeks initiatives of interest to itself and Brazil in third countries, to be implemented 
through trilateral cooperation. Canada, through the former Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA), signed a MoU with its counterpart in Brazil in 2011 to advance the two countries’ 
development relationship through policy dialogue, joint policy research, greater institutional 
linkages and technical cooperation activities in third countries (see Farias, 2015). There have 
been various challenges, however, including: the relationship between Brazil and Canada has 
never been particularly strong; and there is not a deep sense that each other is essential for their 
foreign policy objectives. In addition, their approach to development assistance may diverge, with 
criticism from development actors in Brazil that Canada’s approach at the time increasingly 
linked cooperation to financial conditionalities (Farias, 2015). 
South Africa 
Canada: In comparison, Canada and South Africa have an established relationship, as 
longstanding, signiﬁcant political and commercial partners; with common values, particularly 
equality, democracy, peace, security and prosperity; and shared interest in multilateralism (see 
Besada and Tok, 2015). This can serve as the foundation for a strong development partnership 
between the two countries, whereby Canada contributes knowledge, expertise and best practices 
and, in turn, benefits economically from strengthened and stable emerging markets in Africa. In 
turn, South Africa can leverage triangular cooperation with traditional and multilateral donors and 
counter the increasing competition it faces as a potential donor in Africa from established and 
emerging donors (Besada and Tok, 2015).  
The South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) coordinates South Africa’s foreign 
assistance. As a relatively newly established agency, Canada could initially play an advisory role, 
providing SADPA with technical expertise through short- and long-term training in various areas, 
such as anti-corruption standards, financial management, and monitoring and evaluation 
(Besada and Tok, 2015).  
Turkey 
Germany: Turkey has become an important actor in the global economy in recent years. It has 
also developed into a new donor country. Germany is an example of a traditional donor that has 
sought to strengthen bilateral diplomatic and trade relations with Turkey, through triangular 
cooperation (Hausmann, 2014). Turkey is also interested in positive relations with Germany, and 
on a broader scale, the EU. Triangular cooperation can thus be used to maintain existing 
relations and networks, while contributing to the development of new networks in different 
sectors (e.g. politics, science, economics, technology) of the countries, deepening bilateral 
exchange (Hausmann, 2014). 
Triangular cooperation can also serve the interests of Germany and Turkey at the structural level 
of international development policy, as the two countries can complement the other’s objectives. 
In order to effectively shape global development agendas, Germany seeks to promote the 
involvement of important emerging economies (Hausmann, 2014). Turkey also seeks to 
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contribute more to international processes and to establish itself in the international donor 
landscape (Hausmann, 2014). 
Challenges 
Challenges involved with engaging in triangular aid cooperation include:  
 Complicated coordination efforts and high transaction costs (Zhang, 2015a; Hausmann, 
2014). 
 Fragmentation in development cooperation, with the persistence of small and scattered 
projects in the form of training, dispatching experts, exchange visits, capacity building 
and human resource development (Paulo, 2018; Hausmann, 2014). 
 Fragmentation in a singular country’s strategy – i.e. failure to embed triangular 
cooperation within a country’s broader foreign policy (Paulo, 2018). 
 Absence of a shared narrative among all countries involved. For example, Indian 
observers disliked the UK’s ambiguous position on China’s Belt and Road Initiative 
(Paulo, 2018). 
 Inadequate evaluation, comparing the impact and value of triangular cooperation to other 
forms of traditional technical cooperation projects or less costly instruments such as joint 
symposia or specialist exchange programmes (Lengfelder, 2016; Honda and Sakai, 
2014; Hausmann, 2014). 
 Lack of clarity on what indicators to adopt to measure the degree of success of triangular 
cooperation: e.g. by the amount of resources mobilised; the development result 
achieved; the win-win-win situation created etc. (Sakurai, 2015). 
4. Research & evidence  
Capturing, documenting and sharing evidence of impact and learning can be effective in 
influencing other donors to adopt or replicate particular approaches (Albu and Schneider, 2008). 
Success in joint activities, and the publication of such success, is likely to encourage repeat 
experience, creating a virtuous cycle (Gavas and Maxwell, 2017).  
A review conducted by ICAI (2015) on DFID’s engagement with multilateral agencies finds that 
DFID tends to place a premium on research and to share its research initiatives and insights with 
multilateral agencies. There were positive reports of DFID staff as ‘thinkers’ (ICAI, 2015). DFID 
also uses evidence, such as findings from country monitoring, to shape the agenda of the World 
Bank (ICAI, 2015). DFID’s International Financial Institutions Department, for example, worked 
closely with the World Bank team on the establishment of the regional hub in Nairobi and 
provided feedback from its country monitoring to inform the process (ICAI, 2015). In addition, 
Myers et al. (2017) find that research evidence and policy analysis, generated by DFID’s funding 
and translated into publications, is directly influencing other donors to take media assistance 
more seriously and to understand it better. 
In addition, in advance of IDA16 replenishment negotiations with the World Bank, DFID was 
successful in getting key policy areas as special themes in the final agreement by developing 
working papers and working with like-minded donors and the World Bank to inform and influence 
discussions (ICAI, 2015).  
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The former Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID) introduced the Australian 
Development Research Awards Scheme (ADRAS) in 2007 to increase the quality, diversity and 
transparency of Australia’s development research investment. In operation until 2016, it involved 
regular open competitive calls for research funding with advertised criteria and external experts 
involved in appraisal, with the aim of attracting high-quality researchers to engage in research 
focused on development outcomes (Muirhead et al., 2007). 
The influence of ADRAS research is evident in its use in both national and international policy 
documents. ADRAS work was drawn upon, for example, in the World Bank’s wide 
communication of research on mining infrastructure use for broader economic development; the 
World Tourism Organisation review on climate change and the tourism industry in the Pacific 
Islands; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) paper on gender budgeting work in the Asia–
Pacific region; and in publications by DFID and the OECD (Muirhead et al., 2017). 
The European Think Tanks Group (ETTG) is comprised of think tanks from five countries, linking 
research and policy across national boundaries. The researchers publish materials under the 
ETTG ‘brand’. The ETTG has also created and worked with a group of senior policy-makers, 
known as the ‘EU Change-Makers’, deriving consensus over a series of meetings and joint 
activities (Gavas and Maxwell, 2017). This research and interaction also has the potential to 
influence donor agencies and development outcomes. 
5. Global goals 
The Sustainable Development Goals, and previously the Millennium Development Goals, can 
provide a framework for national development strategies and for multilateral agencies to work 
together (ICAI, 2015). Fukuda-Parr (2014) emphasises that such global goals have the power to 
influence policy behaviour and development agendas, serving as incentives for national 
governments and others to mobilise for important objectives. The goals overcome a key 
weakness of UN conference declarations in that they have the ability to communicate complex 
global challenges into detailed action points that can be understood by policy-makers and the 
general public (Fukuda-Parr, 2014).   
Clear prioritisation of global policy objectives can contribute to providing strategic direction, 
necessary for decision-making in multilateral agencies (Bodenstein et al., 2017). The World 
Bank, for example, substantially increased its overseas development assistance to MDG-like 
goals.  If national-level policymakers buy-in to and adopt global development goals, they are also 
more likely to allocate time and resources to realise them (Sethi et al., 2017). Subsequent to 
2011, non-DAC bilaterals substantially increased their spending in relation to global goals. This 
could signal an attempt on their part to reposition themselves within the aid landscape through 
greater alignment with global development goals (Sethi et al., 2017). 
There have in some cases been unintended negative consequences, however, with national 
planning targets, driven by global goals, introducing distortions in policy priorities (Fukuda-Parr, 
2014). The goals can create perverse effects, privileging some development goals at the 
expense of others (Fukuda-Parr, 2014). 
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6. Competition and geo-politics 
The mere presence of non-DAC donors can influence the actions of other donors. An empirical 
study on the effect of new donors on World Bank conditionality and Africa finds that when China 
plays a role in development assistance in countries in Africa, the World Bank attaches fewer 
conditions to its loans in those countries (Hernandez, 2017). The fewer conditionalities is 
considered to be an attempt by the Bank to maintain the level of its development activities in 
Africa, despite increasing competition from China. In contrast, when DAC donors provide aid 
inflows, the World Bank generally revises its conditionality upward (Hernandez, 2017). This is 
likely because while new donors might present counter oﬀers to ﬁnance projects already in 
negotiation with the World Bank, DAC donors are unlikely to do the same (Hernandez, 2017). 
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